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RAI DOC 21, 2021.12.17 NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT DECISION

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA2021NCSC-162
No. 368A20
Filed 17 December 2021
REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC.
v.
THIRD MOTION EQUITIES MASTER FUND LTD, MAGNETAR CAPITAL MASTER FUND,
LTD., SPECTRUM OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND LTD, MAGNETAR FUNDAMENTAL
STRATEGIES MASTER FUNDS LTD, MAGNETAR MSW MASTER FUND LTD, MASON
CAPITAL MASTER FUND, L.P., BLUE MOUNTAIN CREDIT ALTERNATIVES MASTER FUND
L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN FOINAVEN MASTER FUND L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN GUADALUPE
PEAK FUND L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN SUMMIT TRADING L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN
MONTENVERS MASTER FUND SCA SICAV-SIF, and
BARRY W. BLANK TRUST, defendant-appellantsand
ANTON S. KAWALSKY, trustee for the benefit of Anton S. Kawalsky Trust UA 9/17/2015,
CANYON BLUE CREDIT INVESTMENT FUND L.P., THE CANYON VALUE REALIZATION
MASTER FUND, L.P., CANYON VALUE REALIZATION FUND, L.P., AMUNDI ABSOLUTE
RETURN CANYON FUND P.L.C., CANYON-SL VALUE FUND, L.P., PERMAL CANYON IO
LTD., CANYON VALUE
REALIZATION MAC 18 LTD., defendant-appellees

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(2) from a final judgment entered on 27April
2020 by Chief Business Court Judge Louis A. Bledsoe III in Superior Court, Forsyth County,
after the case was designated a mandatory complex business case by the Chief Justice
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b). Heard in the Supreme Courton 31 August 2021.
Donald H. Tucker Jr., Christopher B. Capel, Clifton L. Brinson, and Gary A. Bornstein, pro
hac vice, for plaintiff-appellee Reynolds American Inc.
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Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard LLP, by Jessica Thaller- Moran and
Jennifer K. Van Zant; and Rolnick Kramer Sadighi LLP, by Lawrence M. Rolnick, pro hac
vice, Sheila A. Sadighi, pro hac vice, and Jennifer
A. Randolph, pro hac vice, for defendant-appellants Mason Capital Master Fund, L.P.,
Blue Mountain Credit Alternatives Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Foinaven Master
Fund L.P., BlueMountain Guadalupe Peak Fund L.P., BlueMountain Summit Trading L.P.,
and BlueMountain Montenvers Master Fund SCA SICAV-SIF.
George F. Sanderson III, Kevin G. Abrams, and J. Peter Shindel Jr. for defendantappellants Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd, Magnetar Capital Master Fund, Ltd,
Spectrum Opportunities Master Fund Ltd, Magnetar Fundamental Strategies Master
Fund Ltd, and Magnetar MSW Master Fund Ltd.
Kieran J. Shanahan, Brandon S. Neuman, and Christopher S. Battles for defendantappellant Barry W. Blank Trust.
No brief for defendant-appellees.
EARLS, Justice.
¶1

This case requires us to interpret and apply N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-01 et seq. todecide
whether the Business Court properly determined the “fair value” of shares held by
shareholders in a tobacco company, Reynolds American Inc. (RAI), who sought judicial
appraisal after RAI was acquired by the international tobacco conglomerate British
American Tobacco (BAT). The Business Court determined that the $59.64 per share plus
interest RAI paid these shareholders (the dissenters) afterthey notified RAI of their intent to
seek judicial appraisal “equals or exceeds the fairvalue of RAI shares as of the date of the
Merger and that RAI is therefore entitled to

REYNOLDS AM. INC. V. THIRD MOTION EQUITIES MASTER FUND LTD.
2021-NCSC-162
Opinion of the Court

a judgment that no further payments to [the dissenters] are required.” Reynolds Am.Inc. v.
Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd., 2020 NCBC 35, 2020 WL 2029621 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2020). On appeal, the dissenters challenge the Business Court’s judgment on various
grounds. For the most part, the dissenters’ challenges relate totheir central assertion that the
Business Court failed to determine the fair value of their shares using “customary and
current valuation concepts and techniques” as required under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).
Instead, in the dissenters’ view, the BusinessCourt “simply deferred to the value of the merger
consideration negotiated by BAT inJanuary 2017 and concluded it was a ‘fair price.’ ”
¶2

The dissenters’ characterization of the analysis performed by the BusinessCourt
is inconsistent with any fair reading of the challenged judgment. Rather than “defer[ ]
entirely to the deal price struck with an insider in the transaction at issue,”the Business Court
appropriately considered the deal price as one indicator of the fairvalue of the dissenters’
shares after finding that given the circumstances of this particular transaction, the deal price
reliably reflected fair value. In addition, the Business Court properly utilized numerous other
“customary and current valuation concepts and techniques” in order to determine the fair
value of the dissenters’ shares. The dissenters’ other challenges to the Business Court’s
judgment are also without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.

The merger and North Carolina’s appraisal statutes
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¶3

On 16 January 2017, BAT entered into an agreement to purchase NorthCarolinabased RAI. Prior to the agreement, BAT owned approximately 42% of RAI’s shares and
controlled several seats on its Board of Directors. However, the merger agreement was
negotiated by BAT and a “Transaction Committee” comprised of non-BAT-affiliated RAI board
members. The merger consideration included 0.5260 sharesof BAT plus $29.44 in cash. On
the date of the merger agreement, this considerationwas worth $59.64 per RAI share. The
transaction ultimately closed on 25 July 2017.On this date, the merger consideration was
worth $65.87 per RAI share. The transaction was “overwhelmingly approved” by a majority
of RAI’s outstanding shares, including ninety-nine percent of the non-BAT-owned shares
which were votedin the merger. Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *34. This transaction
is at the heart of the present case.

¶4

In North Carolina, an individual or entity owning shares in a corporation isentitled
to seek judicial appraisal to determine the fair value of their shares after certain corporate
actions. N.C.G.S. § 55-13-02 (2019). To initiate the appraisalprocess, a shareholder must (1)
“[d]eliver to the corporation, before the vote [on the transaction] is taken, written notice of
the shareholder’s intent to demand payment if the proposed action is effectuated”; and (2)
“[n]ot vote, or cause or permit to be voted, any shares of any class or series in favor of the
proposed action.” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-21(a)(1)–(2) (2019). Next, the corporation “must deliver
a written appraisal notice
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and form . . . to all shareholders who” meet these requirements. N.C.G.S. § 55-13- 22(a)
(2019). Provided that the shareholder does not “vote for or consent to the transaction,”
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-22(b)(1) (2019), the corporation is then obligated to paythe shareholder “the
amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value of their shares, plus interest,” N.C.G.S.
§ 55-13-25(a) (2019). A shareholder who believes thecorporation has not paid fair value
must notify the corporation, at which point the corporation must either accede to the
shareholder’s estimate of fair value or file a complaint against the shareholder to initiate an
appraisal proceeding within sixty days. N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-28(a), 55-13-30(a) (2019).
¶5

During an appraisal proceeding, the trial court is tasked with determining the “fair
value” of the dissenting shareholder’s shares. N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5) (2019).
Subsection 55-13-01(5) defines “fair value” as
[t]he value of the corporation’s shares (i) immediately before
the effectuation of the corporate action as to which the
shareholder asserts appraisal rights, excluding any appreciation
or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless
exclusion would be inequitable,
(ii) using customary and current valuation concepts and
techniques generally employed for similar business in the
context of the transaction requiring appraisal, and
(iii) without discounting for lack of marketability or minority
status except, if appropriate, for amendments to the articles
pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. 55-13-02(a)(5).
Id. In this case, after BAT acquired RAI, a group of dissenting shareholders who believed that
the agreed-upon deal price significantly undervalued RAI refused to
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tender their shares at closing. They sent RAI a signed appraisal form in September 2017.
Subsequently, RAI paid the dissenters “the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair
value of their shares,” $59.64, “plus interest.” N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-22, 55- 13-25(a). The
dissenters refused to accept this offer and conveyed their belief that thefair value of their
shares was between $81.21 and $94.33 per share.
On 29 November 2017, RAI filed a complaint for judicial appraisal pursuant to

¶6

N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30. After a lengthy trial, post-trial briefing, and post-trial oral argument, the
Business Court entered a judgment containing voluminous findings offact in support of its
conclusion that “the fair value of RAI stock as of the TransactionDate was no more than the
deal price of $59.64 per share” and establishing that “[n]ofurther sums are due from RAI to
[the dissenters] for payment of [the dissenters’] shares.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL
2029621, at *71–72. The dissenters appealed directly to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A27(a).
¶7

This Court has not previously considered an appeal from a Business Court
judgment determining the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s shares pursuant to
N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-01 et seq. However, many of the issues raised by the parties have been
thoroughly litigated in other jurisdictions, especially in Delaware. Both parties cite
extensively to Delaware law in their arguments to this Court, as did the BusinessCourt in its
judgment. North Carolina’s appraisal statutes do not exactly mirror Delaware’s statutes, and
regardless, cases decided in a sister jurisdiction are not
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binding on this Court. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 209 N.C. 304,308 (1936)
(“[D]ecisions of other jurisdictions are persuasive, but not binding on us.”)Still, given the welldeveloped body of law arising from the numerous appraisal casesdecided in Delaware, we
borrow freely from these cases to the extent we find their reasoning to be persuasive and
applicable to the facts here. See, e.g., Corwin v. Brit. Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 613 (2018)
(relying on Delaware caselaw to resolve a legal issue arising in a shareholder suit).
II.
¶8

Standard of review

North Carolina’s appraisal statutes vest the Business Court with significant
discretion to decide how best to determine the fair value of a corporation’s shares given the
circumstances of a challenged transaction. The General Assembly chose notto prescribe any
specific methodology the court must utilize in an appraisal proceeding. Rather, the General
Assembly has provided only that a court must determine fair value “using customary and
current valuation concepts and techniquesgenerally employed for similar business[es] in the
context of the transaction requiringappraisal.” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). By implication, it is left
to the Business Court in the first instance to determine which valuation concepts and
techniques should be utilized to ascertain the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s shares
and the weightto accord the results of any particular concept or technique it selects. We
therefore review the Business Court’s choice to utilize or disregard a proposed
valuation
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concept or technique, and its decision to accord a selected concept or technique substantial
or limited probative weight, solely for abuse of discretion.
¶9

In other respects, our standard of review is identical to the standard of reviewwe
utilize in considering an appeal from any judgement entered after a non-jury trial.1 “When
the trial court conducts a trial without a jury, the trial court’s findings of fact have the force
and effect of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal if thereis competent evidence to
support them, even though the evidence could be viewed assupporting a different finding.”
In re Skinner, 370 N.C. 126, 139 (2017) (cleaned up).A trial court's unchallenged findings of
fact are “presumed to be supported by competent evidence and [are] binding on appeal.”
Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93,97 (1991). “Findings not supported by competent evidence
are not conclusive and willbe set aside on appeal.” Penland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 30
(1957). By contrast,“[c]onclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are
reviewablede novo on appeal.” Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517
(2004).

¶ 10

We proceed by examining the dissenters’ claims in three ways. First, to theextent
the dissenters argue that the Business Court should have utilized a method

1 Notably,

both parties agree that the standard of review this Court utilizes when addressing
appeals of judgments entered after a bench trial in other, non-appraisal contextsshould be utilized
here. Neither party proposes that a different standard of review should apply when reviewing a
Business Court judgment determining the fair value of a corporation’s shares.
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for determining fair value it did not rely upon or vice versa, or that the Business Court
accorded too much or too little weight to the results of any particular analysispresented at
trial, we review for abuse of discretion. We will not disturb the BusinessCourt’s judgment
unless the dissenters “show[ ] that its [decision] was manifestly unsupported by reason and
could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 893
(2016) (quoting State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749,
756 (1986)); see also White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 (1985) (“A ruling committed toa trial
court’s discretion is to be accorded great deference

”). Second, to the extent

the dissenters dispute the Business Court’s factual findings, we review those findings to
determine if they are supported by substantial evidence.2 Any findings supported by
substantial evidence are binding, even if there is contrary evidence in the record. See N.C.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., 366 N.C. 505, 512 (2013). Third, to
the extent the dissenters argue that the Business Court either failed to adhere to the
requirements of North Carolina’s appraisal statute or otherwise misapplied relevant law in
valuing the dissenters’ shares, we review de novo.

The dissenters do not expressly state they are challenging any specific findings of fact
entered by the Business Court. However, many of the arguments they advance do encompass
challenges to findings of fact addressing the utilization of or weight given to valuation concepts or
techniques entered by the Business Court in support of its ultimate determination of the fair value of
the dissenters’ shares.
2
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III.
¶ 11

The dissenters’ challenges to the Business Court’s fair value
determination
As the Supreme Court of Delaware has explained, “[i]n a statutory appraisal

proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation positions.”
Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 240 A.3d 3, 17 (Del.
2020) (quoting M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999)). Thus, in an
appraisal proceeding, each side presents evidence to support their contention as to what
represents the fair value of the dissenting shareholders’ shares, and the Business Court
determines the fair value of the shares on the basis of the evidence presented.
¶ 12

On appeal in this case, the dissenters’ central claim is that the Business Courtdid not
determine the fair value of their shares “using customary and current valuation concepts and
techniques.” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). Instead, the dissenters repeatedly assert that the
Business Court ignored this statutory requirement and instead “simply defer[ed] to [the]
deal price negotiated by” BAT and RAI. In the alternative, the dissenters contend that even if
it may generally be permissible to consider the deal price in an appraisal proceeding, the
Business Court erred in utilizing the deal price in this case because the deal was executed
without “a robust market check.”
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A. The Business Court determined the fair value of the dissenters’ shares in
accordance with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).
¶ 13

The dissenters’ argument that the Business Court deferred to the deal price as
conclusively establishing fair value is inconsistent with a careful reading of the Business
Court’s comprehensive judgment. It is correct that the Business Court examined the deal
price and found it illustrative of the fair value of the dissenters’ shares. But the Business
Court in no way suggested that reflexive deference to the deal price would have satisfied its
obligation to determine the fair value of the dissenters’ shares “using customary and current
valuation concepts and techniques,”
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5), or that a court must consider the deal price in every appraisal
proceeding. Instead, the Business Court conducted a thorough analysis and concluded that
“under the circumstances present here, . . . the resulting deal price is reliable evidence of
RAI’s fair value.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *64. This approach represents an
appropriate exercise of the Business Court’s discretion to select valuation methodologies
under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).

¶ 14

Further, the Business Court plainly utilized many other “customary and current
valuation concepts and techniques” in addition to considering the deal price when
determining fair value. The deal price was not the only input the Business Court considered.
For example, the Business Court also examined RAI’s “competitive positioning and
relationship with BAT in the time leading up to the Merger,” id. at
*14, the tobacco industry’s regulatory dynamics, id. at *12, an adjusted unaffected
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share price analysis, id. at *19, “[c]ontemporaneous research analyst commentary,” id. at *20,
valuations produced during the transaction process, id. at *33, an analysis of comparable
precedent transactions, id. at *40, a comparative company analysis, id. at *68, and other
factors. The Business Court’s decision to credit the deal price was informed by the results of
these other methods of valuing RAI’s shares, which confirmed that the deal price was
indicative of fair value. See, e.g., id. at *68 (“[T]he DCF analyses performed by [RAI’s] Financial
Advisors were reliable and constitute persuasive evidence that the fair value of RAI’s shares
as of the Transaction Date was at or below the deal price of $59.64 per share.”). Rather than
choose to value the dissenters’ shares at no more than the deal price of $59.64 per share
because that wasthe deal price, the Business Court utilized a range of acceptable valuation
concepts and techniques to arrive at the conclusion that the deal price reflected fair value.
¶ 15

Courts in other jurisdictions, including Delaware, have routinely consideredthe deal
price as evidence of fair value when warranted by the circumstances of a particular
transaction. See, e.g., Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd., 240 A.3d at 9 (concluding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it “relied on the deal price as the most
reliable indicator of [the corporation’s] fair value”). Here,the Business Court conducted an
analysis using various “customary and current valuation concepts and techniques” including
but not limited to consideration of the deal price. Accordingly, the dissenters’ argument that
the Business Court failed to
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determine the fair value of their shares in a manner comporting with the legal requirements
of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5) is without merit.
B. It was not an abuse of discretion for the Business Court to consider thedeal price
as indicative of the fair value of the dissenters’ shares.
¶ 16

In the alternative, the dissenters argue that the Business Court should haveaccorded
the deal price no probative weight in its appraisal given the circumstances surrounding
BAT’s merger with RAI. According to the dissenters, because the mergerwas negotiated after
“a large inside stockholder ma[d]e an offer and refuse[d] to allowa market check of the price,
deal price cannot be relied upon as evidence of fair value.”

¶ 17

The deal price is only probative in an appraisal proceeding if there existreasons
to believe the deal price reflects fair value. Cf. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,
172 A.3d 346, 349 (Del. 2017) (“[T]here is no presumption in favor of the deal price

”).

We agree with the dissenters that when the directors of
a corporation being sold have completed a market check,3 there is typically reason tobelieve
that the deal price reflects fair value. However, we disagree with the dissenters that a court
necessarily abuses its discretion when it credits the deal priceresulting from a transaction
during which a formal market check was not completed.
¶ 18

The reason the completion of a market check prior to completion of a

3A

market check is “an “investigation typically conducted by an investment banking firm . . .
as part of a process to determine whether a proposed price for the target . . . is fair.”Market Check,
Glossary of Stock Market Terms, NASDAQ,https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/m/market-check (last
visited Dec. 7, 2021).
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transaction supports a court’s decision to credit the deal price in an appraisal proceeding is
that a market check is one way of assuring that a proposed deal price reflects the
corporation’s fair value. Nevertheless, in the absence of a market check, a court is not
compelled to disregard the deal price entirely. We agree with Delawarecourts which have
declined to identify “minimum requirements for . . . sale processesto meet before the deal
price can be considered as a persuasive indicator of fair value.”In re Appraisal of Columbia
Pipeline Grp., Inc., No. 12736-VCL, 2019 WL 3778370, at *42 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019). Absent
a market check, a court still retains the discretion to determine whether other “indicia of
reliability” exist which give the courtreason to trust that the deal price reflects fair value. In
re Panera Bread Co., No. 2017-0593-MTZ, 2020 WL 506684, at *19 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020).
These “indicia of reliability” may include, but are not limited to, “negotiations at arm’slength; board deliberations without any conflicts of interest; buyer due diligence and receipt
of confidential information about the company’s value . . . seller extraction of multiple price
increases . . . [and] the absence of post-signing bidders.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶ 19

In this case, the Business Court specifically found the presence of “numerous
objective indicia of a robust deal process that led to a deal price that reliably reflectedRAI’s
fair value.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *61. This ultimate findingis supported by
additional findings concerning the negotiations leading up to the transaction, including the
Business Court’s finding that the merger was negotiated
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at arms-length by a committee of independent board members who “twice rejected BAT’s
merger offers without countering” and “seriously considered strategic alternatives to a
merger with BAT.” Id. Other relevant findings addressed the contemporaneous reactions to
the deal of various participants in the transaction and of neutral, external observers who
universally assessed the deal price to be fair. See,e.g., id. at *43 (finding that “Mason Capital’s
letter to the Transaction Committee” reflecting its belief that RAI was worth $54.44 per share
“is persuasive evidence of [this dissenting shareholder’s] pre-litigation views of RAI’s
value”). These findings are amply supported by the record. In light of these findings, we
conclude that the Business Court did not abuse its discretion in considering the deal price.
¶ 20

We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the facts that BAT was a minority
stakeholder in RAI prior to the merger and that it had publicly announced it was opposed to
alternative transactions. These facts are certainly relevant when a court assesses “the
persuasiveness of the deal price” in an appraisal proceeding, an assessment which always
depends upon “the reliability of the sale process that generated it.” In re Stillwater Mining
Co., No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851, at
*21 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019). However, in this case, the Business Court determined that the
facts which enhanced the “persuasiveness” of the deal price “outweigh[ed] weaknesses in
the sale process.” In re Panera Bread Co., 2020 WL 506684, at *19. Given
Court’s factual findings addressing the circumstances

the

Business
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surrounding the transaction, we do not believe this determination was “manifestly
unsupported by reason.” Riddick, 315 N.C. at 756. Accordingly, we hold that the Business
Court did not err in considering the deal price evidence of RAI’s fair value.
C. The Business Court did not err in disregarding the results of the
dissenters’ made-for-litigation discounted cash flow analysis.
¶ 21

Next, the dissenters challenge the Business Court’s refusal to adopt thevaluation
proposed by their expert, Dr. Mark Zmijewski, resulting from a discountedcash flow (DCF)
analysis he prepared in advance of trial. The dissenters challenge the Business Court’s
decision to disregard Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis in two ways.First, the dissenters argue that
“[d]espite the uniform agreement that it is the most widely accepted valuation technique,”
the Business Court failed to base its fair value determination on the results of any DCF
analysis in violation of the requirements ofNorth Carolina’s appraisal statutes. Second, the
dissenters argue that the Business Court erred in disregarding Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis
specifically and instead choosing to credit the results of analyses conducted by RAI’s financial
advisors during the deal process. The dissenters contend that only Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF
analysis wasbased on reasonable inputs. We reject the dissenters’ claims.
1. The appraisal statutes did not compel the Business Court to utilize aDCF
analysis to determine fair value.

¶ 22

The dissenters’ first argument that a court fails to comport with therequirements
of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5) if it does not base its fair value determination
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on the results of a DCF analysis is inconsistent with the text and purpose of this provision of
the appraisal statutes. As the Business Court noted, “[a] DCF analysis isan accepted valuation
methodology.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *66 (citing In re Appraisal of Columbia
Pipeline Grp., Inc., 2019 WL 3778370, at *50). Assuch, a DCF analysis may often be one of the
“customary and current valuation concepts and techniques” a court utilizes when
determining the fair value of a corporation’s shares during an appraisal proceeding. Cf. Pinson
v. Campbell-Taggart,Inc., No. CIV.A. 7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28,
1989) (“[T]he
discounted cash flow method is widely accepted in the financial community as a legitimate
valuation technique. . . . [T]he validity of that technique qua valuation methodology is no
longer open to question.”). Nevertheless, while a court may chooseto rely upon a DCF analysis
to determine fair value, nothing in North Carolina’s appraisal statutes demands that the
Business Court do so in every case. A court doesnot inevitably violate N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5)
if it chooses to rely upon other “customary and current valuation concepts and techniques”
instead of or in additionto a DCF analysis to determine fair value.
2. The Business Court did not abuse its discretion in assessing Dr.
Zmijewski’s DCF analysis to be unreliable.
¶ 23

In the alternative, the dissenters contend that the Business Court abused its
discretion in choosing to credit the results of the contemporaneous analyses performed by
RAI’s financial advisors during the deal process rather than Dr.
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Zmijewski’s DCF analysis. On this issue, the Business Court found that
[b]ased on the admissible evidence of record . . . Dissenters’
valuation of $92.17 is an extreme outlier. It implies a $50 billion
mispricing of RAI’s shares . . . . [It] is starklyinconsistent with all
other evidence of value including the market evidence,
contemporaneous DCFs, and various sanity checks that
Dissenters’ experts agree are a typical part of the valuation
process.
Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *54. According to the dissenters, the Business
Court’s choice to disregard the results of Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis was manifestly
unreasonable because his was the only analysis which incorporated a setof ten-year financial
projections RAI created and presented at an internal strategic planning meeting.
Although the parties agree that a DCF analysis is a universally acceptedmethod

¶ 24

for valuing a company, it is sensitive and its “result . . . depends critically onits inputs.” Merlin
Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015).
Depending on how the analyst’s financial model is constructed, small changes to its inputs
can produce dramatic swings in the resultingvaluation. See id. (“For example, small changes
to the assumed cost of capital can dramatically impact the result.”). Thus, a court is well
within its discretion to reject the valuation which results from a DCF analysis if the court
assesses its underlyinginputs to be unreliable. Cf. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven
Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 37 (Del. 2017) (finding the deal price more persuasive than
the
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results of a DCF analysis “given the obvious lack of credibility of the petitioners’ DCFmodel—
as well as legitimate questions about the reliability of the projections upon which all of the
various DCF analyses are based”). Indeed, the fact that the results of a DCF analysis are
extremely sensitive to minor variations in the value of a single input may itself be reason to
doubt its results. Cf. In re Panera Bread Co., 2020 WL 506684, at *41 (concluding that a
particular DCF analysis was “fatal[ly] unreliab[le]” because adjusting one input produced
“wild swings in value”).
¶ 25

Here, the primary reason the Business Court rejected Dr. Zmijewski’s DCFanalysis
was because it was extremely sensitive to changes to the value of a single input, and the court
doubted that Dr. Zmijewski’s choice as to where to fix the valueof this input was reasonable.
The Business Court explained that the discrepancy between Dr. Zmijewski’s valuation and
the financial advisors’ valuation resulted almost entirely from Dr. Zmijewski’s choice to
assume a “substantially higher” perpetuity growth rate (PGR) than the advisors. Reynolds
Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *50. The reason Dr. Zmijewski’s PGR was “substantially higher”
than theadvisors’ PGR was that it was based on a set of internal RAI projections showing
steady short-term growth continuing consistently for ten years, whereas the financial
advisors’ projections were based on “a long-term view of the prospects of the Companyand the
industry rather than the specifics of a few nearer-term years.” Id. at *49. TheBusiness Court
found, and the dissenters do not dispute, that “the vast majority of
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Zmijewski’s valuation is dependent on the PGR that was used.” Id. at *51. Given thesensitivity
of Dr. Zmijewski’s valuation to his choice of PGR, the Business Court made the reasonable
choice to closely examine this input.
¶ 26

The Business Court found Dr. Zmijewski’s choice of a PGR to be “unreasonable and
unreliable.” Id. at *51. According to the Business Court, Dr. Zmijewski’s selectionof a PGR was
based on another expert’s analysis which
ignores . . . the substantial evidence showing that these ten-year
projections were not intended to create aprobability-weighted
value of future cash flows, disregarded significant assumptions
and sensitivities that could dramatically impact RAI’s business,
and were largelyextrapolations of current industry trends and
dynamics without substantial change.
Id. Although the dissenters repeatedly attack the Business Court’s characterization of the
ten-year projections, we cannot say that the court’s findings addressing the purpose and
utility of the projections are unreasonable. The Business Court expresslyfound that the tenyear projections were not intended to—and did not in fact—reflectRAI’s view of the most
likely trajectory of its future cash flows, and were instead useful only for strategic planning
purposes because the projections made no effort toaccount for possible long-term structural
threats to RAI’s business. Id. at *25. The Business Court also found that “[t]estimony from the
[financial advisors] . . . indicatesthat it was typical when performing valuation work to receive
and use five-year projections from management.” Id. at *28. These findings are supported by
the record
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and support the Business Court’s decision not to credit the results of Dr. Zmijewski’sDCF
analysis.
¶ 27

It is also appropriate for courts to be skeptical of the results of DCF analysesthat are
wildly out of step with “alternative valuation methodologies [used] as a ‘sanity check’ to test
the reasonableness of conclusions based on a particular methodology.” In re Adelphia
Commc’ns Corp., 512 B.R. 447, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The Business Court found, and the
dissenters do not dispute, that the valuation resultingfrom Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis “far
exceeds any other evidence of value in the record and suggests that RAI’s management, RAI’s
Board, RAI’s Financial Advisors, RAI’s shareholders, stock market analysts, and the market
itself mispriced RAI by asmuch as $50 billion.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *35.
This would appearto reflect, as the Business Court described, “the largest mispricing ever
identified in an appraisal case in North Carolina, Delaware, or elsewhere, by far.” Id. at *54.
Although a court might appropriately choose to credit the outlier results of a DCF analysis
when there are reasons to distrust other proposed valuation methodologies,such a dramatic
divergence as exhibited here—attributable almost entirely to the modeler’s choice of value
on a single input—reasonably gave the Business Court cause to doubt the reliability of Dr.
Zmijewski’s analysis.

¶ 28

A court generally possesses the discretion to choose to accord little probativeweight
to the results of a particular DCF analysis if there are legitimate justifications

REYNOLDS AM. INC. V. THIRD MOTION EQUITIES MASTER FUND LTD.
2021-NCSC-162
Opinion of the Court

for that choice. Further, a court possesses the discretion to “have greater confidence in
market indicators and less confidence in divergent expert determinations,” especially when
there is “a persuasive market-based metric” such as “the deal price that resulted from a
reliable sale process.” In re Stillwater Mining Co., No. 2017- 0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851, at
*61. In this case, given the Business Court’s findingsregarding the unsuitability of RAI’s tenyear projections as inputs to a DCF analysis,the comparative reliability of other market-based
methodologies, and the vast divergence between the result of the dissenters’ made-forlitigation DCF analysis andthe deal price along with other contemporaneous indicia of fair
value, we have no trouble concluding that the Business Court did not abuse its discretion in
choosing not to credit the results of Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis.
D. The Business Court did not err in choosing to credit the results of RAI’sadjusted
unaffected stock price analysis.
¶ 29

Next, the dissenters challenge the Business Court’s reliance on testimony fromRAI’s
expert witness, Professor Paul Gompers. Professor Gompers presented the results of an
adjusted unaffected stock price analysis he conducted which estimated that had the merger
with BAT not been announced, the value of a share of RAI on the date the transaction closed
would have been between $53.78 and $55.33. The Business Court found Professor
Gompers’s analysis to be “persuasive evidence that suggests that the deal price is consistent
with, and Dissenters’ proposed valuation is inconsistent with, RAI’s fair value on the
Transaction Date.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020
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WL 2029621, at *38.
¶ 30

In a judicial appraisal proceeding, the court is tasked with determining thevalue of
the shares of the corporation subject to the proceeding “immediately before the effectuation
of the corporate action as to which the shareholder asserts appraisalrights, excluding any
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion would
be inequitable.” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). Public disclosure of a possible impending acquisition
can, on its own, drive up the price of the target corporation’s shares. Cf. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v.
Covance, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4115 (SAS), 2000 WL 1752848, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000)
(unpublished) (“When
two companies announce a merger, their stock prices generally tend to follow a predictable
pattern. Normally, the share price of the target will increase following the announcement of
a plan to merge, while the acquiror’s share price usually declines.”). Thus, a court which
chooses to consider the market price of the target corporation’s shares when assessing fair
value may choose to “adjust” the corporation’s share price on the transaction date to excise
the change in value whichitself results from the announcement of the transaction.

¶ 31

In this case, the Business Court found that
RAI’s July 24, 2017 stock price is not a relevant proxy for fair
value on the Transaction Date because after BAT’s
announcement of its October 20 Offer, RAI’s stock price would
have reflected the expected deal price, including expected
synergies created by the Merger, and the market’s view of the
likelihood of the deal closing.
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Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *37. To approximate how RAI’s stock price would
have evolved between the public disclosure of BAT’s offer and the closing date, in a
counterfactual universe where the public had no knowledge of any possible impending
transaction, the Business Court turned to Professor Gompers. His analysis attempted to both
exclude the effect on RAI’s stock price of the investors’ anticipation of the merger and
account for the impact “other market industry developments would likely have had on RAI’s
stock price between BAT’s October 20 Offer and the closing of the Merger on July 25, 2017[.]”
Id. at *38. Based upon Professor Gompers’s analysis, which indexed RAI’s stock price “to the
performance ofits closest competitor, Altria, and to the performance of the S&P 500 generally
from October 20, 2016 through July 24, 2017,” the Business Court determined that “while
RAI’s stock price may have appreciated to some degree in the time between the October 20
Offer and the Transaction Date, RAI’s stock would still have traded 7% to10% below the deal
price as of July 24, 2017.” Id.
¶ 32

The dissenters raise numerous arguments challenging the Business Court’sreliance
on Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis. Collectively, these claims
assert (1) that Professor Gompers’s testimony was inadmissible, and (2) that even if the
testimony was admissible, his analysis was unreliable. We address these challenges here and
conclude they are meritless.
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1. Professor Gompers’s testimony regarding his adjusted unaffectedstock
price analysis was admissible.
¶ 33

We first address the dissenters’ evidentiary claim that the Business Courterred in
admitting Professor Gompers’s testimony. The probative value of a stock price analysis in an
appraisal proceeding is connected to the efficiency of the marketfor the corporation’s shares.
The probative value of any market price-based analysis is enhanced when the market for the
corporation’s shares is “semi-strong efficient, meaning that the market’s digestion and
assessment of all publicly available information concerning [the corporation being assessed]
was quickly impounded intothe Company’s stock price.” Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 7. When the
market is not semi- strong efficient, the corporation’s stock price might not reliably reflect
its fair value, and evidence regarding the corporation’s stock price is likely to be less
probative in an appraisal proceeding.

¶ 34

In this case, Professor Gompers did not independently determine that themarket
for RAI’s stock was semi-strong efficient. Instead, Professor Gompers testified that in
conducting his analysis, he adopted the conclusion of a different expert, Dr. Anil Shivdasani,
who had conducted an analysis which supported his own opinion that the market for RAI
shares was semi-strong efficient. Dr. Shivdasani did not testify at trial. According to the
dissenters, RAI’s failure to elicit testimony from Dr. Shivdasani rendered Professor
Gompers’s testimony regarding the adjusted unaffected stock price analysis inadmissible.
They advance three theories in support
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of this contention.
a. The Business Court was not required to draw an inference against RAIbased
on its failure to call an expert witness.
¶ 35

The dissenters’ first theory is that allowing Professor Gompers to present
testimony based upon the opinion of a non-testifying expert violated the “missing witness
rule.” Where it has been recognized, the missing witness rule allows the factfinder to draw
an inference regarding a disputed factual issue that is adverse to a party who “fail[s] to call
an available witness with peculiar knowledge of the fact tobe established.” Yarborough v.
Hughes, 139 N.C. 199, 209 (1905). Dissenters argue that because RAI failed to call Dr.
Shivdasani at trial, it was error for the Business Court not to infer that the market for RAI’s
shares was not semi-strong efficient.

¶ 36

This Court has not formally adopted the missing witness rule. Regardless, even
assuming that the missing witness rule is recognized in North Carolina, the dissenters’
argument entirely ignores the flexible nature of the rule. Even calling themissing witness rule
a “rule” is somewhat of a misnomer. As the Court of Appeals correctly explained in the
spoliation of evidence context, these kind of “rules” are really permissible inferences. Under
appropriate circumstances, the factfinder “may draw an inference from the intentional
spoliation of evidence that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party
that destroyed it.” McLain v. TacoBell Corp., 137 N.C. App. 179, 183 (2000) (emphasis added)
(quoting Beers v. BaylinerMarine Corp., 236 Conn. 769, 775 (1996)). Nothing compels the
factfinder to
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ultimately draw the requested inference. Cf. Katkish v. Dist. of Columbia, 763 A.2d 703, 706
(D.C. 2000) (“Even when the inference is permissible, the finder of fact is free to draw the
inference, or not.”).
¶ 37

In this case, the Business Court explained that “in the exercise of itsdiscretion,” it
would “den[y] Dissenters’ request for an adverse inference arising fromShivdasani’s failure
to testify.” The reasons the Business Court provided to support its refusal to draw an adverse
inference amply justify its decision. After RAI failed to call Dr. Shivdasani, the dissenters
possessed the right to introduce Dr. Shivdasani’s deposition testimony as substantive
evidence at trial. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 32(a)(4) (2019) (“The deposition of a witness,
whether or not a party, may be used byany party for any purpose if . . . the witness is an expert
witness whose testimony has been procured by videotape as provided for under Rule
30(b)(4).”). They chose not to exercise this right. As the dissenters themselves acknowledge,
Dr. Shivdasani’s “expert report . . . opined that the economic evidence was consistent with
RAI stock trading in a semi-strong efficient market.” Although the dissenters also contend
that the “event study” upon which Dr. Shivdasani’s opinion was based “demonstrated that
RAI’s market was inefficient,” if that were correct, nothing prevented them from questioning
Dr. Shivdasani about this discrepancy during his deposition and introducing that testimony
as substantive evidence at trial. Deposition testimony is certainly not the same as live
witness testimony, but the dissenters’ choice not to
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exercise their procedural right to introduce Dr. Shivdasani’s testimony supports the
Business Court’s assessment that the substance of his testimony would not have bolstered
the dissenters’ argument.
¶ 38

Further, Dr. Shivdasani did not possess any factual information he alone couldtestify to
which was otherwise unavailable to the dissenters, given the nature of the questions he was
tasked with answering and the availability of pretrial discovery of expert-witness reports.
Nothing prevented the dissenters from introducing evidence at trial that the market for RAI’s
shares was not semi-strong efficient. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained,
an expert is unlikely to be in exclusive possession of factual
evidence that would justify an adverse inference charge.
Rarely will an expert be in a position to reveal
previously undisclosed factual information, for the first time, on
the stand at trial
[I]t is the unusual setting in
which a party’s decision not to call an expert witness will be
prompted by the party’s fear that the expert will reveal
unfavorable facts that would otherwise not be disclosed.
Washington v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338, 361–62, 98 A.3d 1140, 1153–54 (2014). Therefore, the
Business Court did not err by choosing not to draw an adverse inference againstRAI based
upon RAI’s failure to call Dr. Shivdasani to testify.
b. Direct expert-witness testimony was not required to prove that the marketfor
RAI’s shares was semi-strong efficient.

¶ 39

In the alternative, the dissenters assert that the predicate question of whether a
market is semi-strong efficient can only be answered by direct expert-witness
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testimony. The Business Court found, and RAI does not dispute, that “RAI did not offer expert
testimony to establish that the market for RAI’s stock was semi-strong form efficient.”
Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *36 n.37. However, the courtconcluded “that expert
testimony on market efficiency is not necessary to the Court’sdetermination in light of the
undisputed evidence of record establishing that the market for RAI’s shares was semi-strong
efficient at the time of the Merger.” Id. Thedissenters argue that in the absence of expertwitness testimony, the Business Courtwas not at liberty to conclude that the market for RAI’s
shares was semi-strong efficient and that, by extension, the court could neither admit nor
credit Professor Gompers’s testimony regarding his adjusted unaffected stock price analysis.
¶ 40

We decline to adopt a bright-line rule which would prohibit a court from findingthat the
market for a corporation’s shares is semi-strong efficient in the absence of direct expertwitness testimony. Although direct expert-witness testimony may bolster a party’s argument
that a market is semi-strong efficient, market efficiency is“not [an] all-or-nothing concept[ ],”
and the “operative question” in an appraisal proceeding is whether a given market is
“efficient enough . . . to warrant consideringthe trading price as a valuation indicator when
determining fair value.” In reStillwater Mining Co., No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851, at
*52. As the SupremeCourt of Delaware has explained,
[a] market is more likely efficient, or semi-strong efficient,if it
has many stockholders; no controlling stockholder;
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highly active trading; and if information about the company is
widely available and easily disseminated to themarket. In such
circumstances, a company’s stock price reflects the judgments
of many stockholders about the company’s future prospects,
based on public filings, industry information, and research
conducted by equity analysts. In these circumstances, a mass of
investors quickly digests all publicly available information
about a company, and in trading the company’s stock,
recalibratesits price to reflect the market’s adjusted, consensus
valuation of the company.
Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 25 (cleaned up). A court which receives competent evidence addressing
these and other relevant factors may find that a market is semi-strong efficient with or
without direct expert-witness testimony.4 While that evidence may include an expert’s
opinion that the market is efficient, an expert’s opinion is not strictly necessary. See, e.g., In
re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., No. 12080-CB, 2018 WL 3625644, at *24 (Del. Ch. July
30, 2018) (determining that “the record supports the conclusion that the market for [the
company’s] stock was efficient and well-functioning” based on the company’s market
capitalization, weekly tradingvolume, bid-ask spread, short-interest ratio, amount of analyst
coverage, and price responsiveness to public release of information about the company).
Accordingly, we

To be sure, expert testimony may help the Business Court knowledgeably examine these
factors. In re Stillwater Mining Co., No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851, at *50 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21,
2019) (explaining that the “the guidance of experts trained in” economics and corporate finance can
help “law-trained judges” navigate “the thicket of market efficiency”). Nevertheless, we conclude that
a party need not present expert testimony specifically conveying that expert’s ultimate opinion
regarding market efficiency if the party has presented sufficient evidence regarding the relevant
factors to allow the trial court to make its own efficiency determination.
4
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reject the dissenters’ argument that the Business Court’s admission of and reliance on
Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis was erroneousbecause market
efficiency was not directly established via direct expert-witness testimony.
c. Professor Gompers’s testimony was not otherwise inadmissible.
¶ 41

Additionally, the dissenters contend that Professor Gompers’s testimony was
inadmissible because he impermissibly vouched for the results of analyses conductedby RAI’s
financial advisors. At trial, Professor Gompers testified that he had examined the analyses
performed by RAI’s financial advisors in conducting his own analysis of the value of RAI’s
shares. He explained that, in his view, it was appropriate to use five-year projections in
performing a DCF analysis, as the financialadvisors had. By contrast, he explained that he had
significant reservations about the inputs Dr. Zmijewski relied on in conducting his DCF
analysis.

¶ 42

The crux of the dissenters’ argument is that Professor Gompers did not perform an
independent analysis which formed the basis of his opinion as to the fair value ofRAI or the
reliability of the various inputs utilized in other valuation analyses. By extension, the
dissenters argue that his testimony regarding the financial advisors’ analyses did nothing
more than “parrot” their opinions and “vouch” for their credibility.

¶ 43

In general, an expert witness is not permitted to convey an opinion regarding
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another witness’s credibility, as credibility determinations are left to the factfinder. See, e.g.,
State v. Warden, 376 N.C. 503, 507 (2020) (“[I]t is typically improper for a party to seek to
have the witnesses vouch for the veracity of another witness.” (cleaned up)). However, an
expert is permitted to offer an opinion based upon materials that would otherwise be
inadmissible as evidence, provided that thematerials are “of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field.”
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 703 (2019). An expert is permitted to testify regarding how andwhy he
or she adopted certain assumptions contained in those materials—anddisregarded others—
when conducting his or her own independent analysis, providedthat the expert has “form[ed]
his [or her] own opinions by applying his [or her] extensive experience and a reliable
methodology to the inadmissible materials.” United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir.
2008) (cleaned up).
¶ 44

In this case, Professor Gompers explained how and why his independentanalysis
of the value of RAI bolstered his assessment of “the validity and reasonableness of the
Financial Advisors’ inputs, analyses, and valuations.” ReynoldsAm. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at
*74. As the Business Court explained, Professor Gompers “performed his own detailed,
independent analyses using customary valuation techniques and relying on his training and
expertise as a financial economist.” Id. Professor Gompers then testified that the results of
his analysis “all line[d] up a lot” with the financial advisors’ analyses, and with every other
attempt
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to value RAI’s shares except for the results of the analysis performed by Dr. Zmijewski, which
were, in Professor Gompers’s estimation, “way off.” For example, Professor Gompers testified
that based on the “comparable companies” and “precedent transaction” analyses he
conducted, he would have had “serious concern[s]about the assumptions” he was making if
he had performed a DCF analysis which produced a valuation of RAI’s shares similar to the
result of Dr. Zmijewski’s analysis. This made Professor Gompers more confident in the
assumptions underpinning the financial advisors’ analyses and less confident in the
assumptions underpinning Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF analysis.
¶ 45

The dissenters’ argument that this testimony was improper again implies thatthe only
“customary and current valuation concept[ ] and technique[ ]” permitted under N.C.G.S. § 5513-01(5) is a DCF analysis. While a DCF analysis is one widely accepted method of valuing a
company, it is not the only one. Professor Gompers testified that he “read every single analyst
report around the deal, around the merger,for both RAI and for BAT” because reviewing these
kinds of contemporaneous reportswas something that financial economists “absolutely” do
whenever they attempt to assess the value of a company. He also testified to the results of
the valuation analyses he performed using other “customary and current valuation concepts
and techniques,” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5), including his “own comparable company and
precedent transaction analys[e]s.” Professor Gompers did not testify that he believed
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the financial advisors’ valuation was reasonable and Dr. Zmijewski’s was unreasonable
because he believed the advisors were more credible than Dr. Zmijewski. Instead, he utilized
his expertise as a financial economist to value RAI and, in the process, examined the various
assumptions underpinning different attempts to value RAI which he incorporated into his
own independent analysis. He ultimately “g[ave] his own opinion” as to the value of RAI’s
shares, rather than serving as a “mouthpiece” for the financial advisors. Malletier v. Dooney
& Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 664–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Accordingly, the Business Court
did not err in admitting Professor Gompers’s testimony.5
2. The Business Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to creditProfessor
Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis.
¶ 46

The dissenters’ next set of arguments challenge the Business Court’s decisionto rely
upon Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis. The Business Court
found that
[e] xperts for both sides . . . agreed that the market for most

publicly traded stocks on most days is close to semi-strongform
efficient, particularly stock for large companies like RAI. (Yilmaz
Tr. 1967:7–13; Gompers Tr. 785:3–8.) Although both sides’
experts agreed that the fact a company is widely traded on a
national exchange does not mean it automatically trades in a
semi-strong efficient market at any given point, (Gompers Tr.
833:23–834:6; Zmijewski Tr. 1320:17–1321:2), given the
evidence introduced by RAI, which was not disputed by
Dissenters,
5 For

these reasons, we also reject the dissenters’ argument that Professor Gompers’s
testimony impermissibly summarized factual evidence and provided a recitation of hearsay.
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there is a sufficient factual record for the Court to determine
that the market for RAI’s stock was semi-strongform efficient:
a. Until the Merger, RAI was publicly traded in high
volumes and with high liquidity on the NYSE, the largest
stock exchange by market capitalization and monthly
trading volume in the world. (JX0017.0003.)
b. RAI was a very large company with a market
capitalization of approximately $67.3 billion on October
20, 2016. (Gompers Tr. 777:25–778:10; PX0115.0181.)
c. Information about RAI was both widely availableand
readily disseminated to the market. (de Gennaro Tr.
215:15–23 (“No indication that the market wasn’t
absorbing news on a regular basis.”).) For most public
companies, “most of the relevant information is
disclosed.” (Wajnert Tr. 124:4–7.)
d. RAI’s historical stock price increased and decreased
in relation to the release of new Company- specific
information and market-wide trends. (Wajnert Tr.
59:10–60:4; de Gennaro Tr. 215:15–23.)
e. RAI’s stock was followed by 16 equity analysts, who
frequently published research about the Company.
(PX0063.0010, .0025; de Gennaro Tr. 187:18–188:8
(RAI was “a well-covered company . . . . A lot of analysts
issued regular reports.”).) These analysts were wellinformed about RAI’s business and the U.S. tobacco
industry. (PX0063.0010, .0025; de Gennaro Tr. 187:18–
188:8, 199:2–19.)
f. RAI did not have a controlling shareholder at anytime
prior to the Merger. (JX0023.0080; Wajnert Tr. 63:18–
64:18.)
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Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *36. The dissenters do not directly challengeany of
these underlying factual findings as unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, in examining
the dissenters’ legal arguments, these findings of fact are binding on appeal. King v. Bryant,
369 N.C. 451, 463 (2017). None of the dissenters’ legal arguments on this issue are
persuasive.
a. The Business Court considered appropriate factors in examining market
efficiency.
¶ 47

First, the dissenters argue that the factors the Business Court identified as
supporting its determination that the market for RAI’s shares was semi-strong efficient—
and which, by extension, supported its decision to credit Professor Gompers’s adjusted
unaffected stock price analysis in its fair value determination— were “not a reliable tool for
identifying the type of market efficiency that matters in appraisal litigation.” According to
the dissenters, the Business Court “pointed to theso-called ‘Cammer Factors’ as supporting
market efficiency,” even though the case those factors are drawn from, Cammer v. Bloom, 711
F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989), involved “the ‘fraud on the market’ theory . . . in federal securities
fraud litigation,” which “sheds no light whatsoever on what the ‘true value’ or ‘fair value’ of
the stock is.”

¶ 48

The dissenters are correct that the Business Court cited Cammer in explaining how
courts in other jurisdictions “have identified numerous factual criteria to be considered in
assessing whether the market for a particular security is efficient.”
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Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *74. However, the Business Court also relied upon
other cases in which courts considered many of the same factors examined by the Business
Court when assessing market efficiency for the purposes of conducting a judicial appraisal.
Id. (citing In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., No. 12456-VCS, 2019WL 3244085, at *27 (Del. Ch.
July 19, 2019), and In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings,Inc., No. 12080-CB, 2018 WL 3625644
(Del. Ch. July 30, 2018)). Delaware courts haveexpressly identified similar factors as relevant
when determining market efficiency in appraisal proceedings. See Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 7.
And Delaware courts have explicitly relied upon the Cammer factors in this same context. See
In re Stillwater Mining Co., No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851, at *56 (“Absent any
countervailing evidence, [the expert witness’s] analysis of the Cammer . . . factors would
support a finding that the trading market for [the corporation’s] common stockhad sufficient
attributes to be regarded as informationally efficient.”). We find these cases persuasive.
Accordingly, the Business Court did not err when it examined these factors in assessing
market efficiency.
b. The Business Court did not fail to account for the existence of any material
nonpublic information; instead, it permissibly found that no material nonpublic
information existed.
¶ 49

Second, the dissenters argue that the Business Court failed to account for theexistence
of “material non-public information that BAT had and the investing public did not.” A
purchaser’s possession of material nonpublic information could render the
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target corporation’s stock price “unreliable” if there is “sufficient information asymmetry
between the market and insiders.” Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d
313, 326 (Del. 2020). When this occurs, a corporation’s stock price may not reflect the
corporation’s fair value because the market lacks pertinentinformation traders would likely
have reacted to in the event this information had been publicly disclosed. In this case, the
dissenters identify two sources of purportedly material nonpublic information which BAT
possessed: (1) RAI’s internal documents which projected “7[ to ]8% growth in years six
through ten of its ten-year projections,”and (2) the knowledge that “RAI management had
been authorized to purchase up to
$2 billion of RAI stock on the public markets at prices up to $65 per share.”
¶ 50

The Business Court specifically found that the information identified by the
dissenters was not material.
203. Dissenters also sought to prove at trial that RAI’s
stock price was not a reliable indicator of fair value because of
the existence of certain material nonpublic information that was
not reflected in the stock price: (i) theTop-Side Adjustments to
the October 2016 Projections provided to the Financial
Advisors, (ii) the projected growth rates for years six through ten
in the June 2016 LE, and (iii) the $65 share repurchase
authorization ceiling. (See Defs.’ Resp. Post-Trial Br. 22–24.)
None of this nonpublic information warrants disregarding RAI’s
Unaffected Stock Price as evidence of value. Indeed, Dissenters’
expert, Yilmaz, admitted that he did not have an opinion “one
way or the other on whether the private information at the
company, on balance, was more negative or more positive[.]”
(Yilmaz Tr. 1959:1–12 (“Given that I have not done the work, I
[can] not opine on that.”).)
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204. First, the Top-Side Adjustments amounted to an
additional $1.4 billion in RAI’s income before taxes, or roughly
$300 million added to each year of the five-year projections.
(DX240, at tab “top side adj,” row 14; Price Tr.989:18–990:16.)
As of the record date of June 12, 2017, RAI had approximately
1.426 billion shares of common stock outstanding.
(JX0023.0029.) Given RAI’s immense size, public disclosure of
this additional projected income wouldnot likely have affected
the stock price in a meaningful way, and it does not undermine
the relevance of the Unaffected Stock Price as evidence of value.
There is certainly no basis to find that this information could
justifythe massive premiums to RAI’s Unaffected Stock Price for
which Dissenters advocate. Further, some of the Top-Side
Adjustments were based on public information that had not yet
been incorporated into the October 2016 LE, such as changes to
state tax laws and effects from positive stock market
performance. (Price Tr. 957:22–958:6.)
205. Next, as discussed previously, the growth rates in
years six through ten of the June 2016 LE were based largely on
extrapolations of current volume and pricing trends in the
industry, which were publicly available and therefore already
likely to be reflected in RAI’s stock price.(Gilchrist Tr. 375:2–24,
404:9–406:6, 529:12–25.)
206. Moreover, and also as previously discussed, RAI
management credibly testified—and the documents relating to
the ten-year projections confirmed—that the projections for
these later years did not account for any of the various serious
risks facing the Company. (DX0023.0002; Gilchrist Tr. 410:8–
412:2.) In particular, they were not intended to be used to value
RAI’s shares butonly in connection with certain limited planning
objectives.The projected growth rates were not based on any
underlying material, value-relevant information about specific
business plans or other developments. They did not constitute
the kind of information that, if disclosed, would have
meaningfully affected the stock price, and they do not provide
any reason to believe that the fair value of RAI
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materially deviated from the Unaffected Stock Price. Dissenters
do not contest that RAI was not required to have disclosed these
projections. (Yilmaz Tr. 1959:15–25.)
207. Finally, the authorization ceiling for the share
repurchase approved by the Board is not material, valuerelevant information because it was not a valuation of RAI.
Rather, as discussed above, it was an internal corporate
authorization for a purchasing program, which was
intentionally set at a price that was higher than what RAI
management ever expected it would need to spend. (Gilchrist
Tr. 414:19–415:1.) Indeed, Zmijewski pointedly declined to
testify that the authorization ceiling was value- relevant
information even when prompted by counsel. (Zmijewski Tr.
1316:10–1317:3.)
Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *37. Once again, we are not entitled to disregard
these findings if they are supported by competent evidence.
¶ 51

Here, the record evidence identified by the Business Court supports its findingthat the
six-to-ten-year projections were created to model one possible scenario for RAI’s future
which intentionally did not account for long-term structural risks to thebusiness. The record
evidence also supports its finding that the share purchase authorization did not reflect the
Board of Directors’ actual assessment of the value ofRAI’s shares. The Business Court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that materials which revealed little about how RAI valued
its own business would not have caused the market to alter its assessment of RAI’s value had
the materials beenpublicly disclosed.
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c. The Business Court did not fail to account for the timing of BAT’s offer.
¶ 52

Third, the dissenters argue that Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stockprice
analysis did not reflect the fair value of their shares because the Business Court failed to
account for “the timing of BAT’s offer [which] appeared timed to take advantage of a 12%
sell-off in the price of RAI stock that occurred immediately priorto the offer.” This argument
suffers from the same deficiency as the dissenters’ previous argument in that it entirely
ignores the Business Court’s factual findings directly addressing this claim.
197. On October 20, 2016, RAI’s common stock closed
at $47.17 per share (the “Unaffected Stock Price”). (Corr. Stip’d
Facts ¶ 13.) The evidence shows that this pricedid not represent
a substantial deviation from the price atwhich RAI’s stock was
previously trading. RAI’s 52-week trading average prior to
BAT’s initial offer was approximately $49.00. (PX0115.0258.)
RAI’s common stockhit its all-time high of $54.48 per share on
July 5, 2016. (PX0115.0390.) In fact, RAI’s share price had
realized significant gains in the years leading up to BAT’s initial
offer. (PX0063.0039.)
198. RAI’s stock was trading “at a peak multiple in the
marketplace” prior to BAT’s October 20 offer. (Gilchrist Tr.
560:22–561:11.) Although RAI’s share price had dropped at that
time from its all-time high three months before, from the time
the Lorillard Transaction closed in June 2015 until October 20,
2016, the volume weighted average price of RAI stock was
$46.26—slightly below the Unaffected Stock Price. And trading
data shows that the deal price was substantially above prior
price levels[.]
Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *35. For the reasons stated above, we will
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not disturb the Business Court’s findings on this issue. Therefore, we reject the dissenters’
argument that Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis was not
reflective of fair value due to the timing of BAT’s offer.
d. The Business Court did not err by failing to award the dissenters a controlpremium.
¶ 53

Fourth, the dissenters argue that Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffectedshare
price analysis did not reflect the fair value of their shares because the analysis“did not reflect
a control premium.” “A control premium is an upward adjustment to the value of stock when
the block of stock being valued enables the holder to control the corporation.” Jay W.
Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 Del. J.Corp. L. 37, 135 (1997). In contrast
to a person or entity who owns only a minority stake in a corporation, a person or entity who
obtains a controlling stake in a corporation “can elect directors, appoint management,
declare and pay dividends, determine corporate policy, etc.” Id. Thus, a share of a corporation
is theoretically worth more to the purchaser when the share enables the purchaser to obtain
a controlling stake in the corporation than it is to any individual minority shareholder,
because the controlling stakeholder can “captur[e] synergies with the assets alreadyowned
by the new controller or by reducing agency costs through managing the company
differently.” Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short andPuzzling Life of the
“Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2007).
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¶ 54

The Business Court considered and rejected the dissenters’ argument that itwas
required to award the dissenters a “control premium” to correct for the possibility that the
price of RAI’s publicly traded shares “implicitly contain[ed] a minority discount.”6 Reynolds
Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *66. According to the Business Court, the dissenters’
argument might “have some currency in closely-held corporations, [but] it has no application
here in the public company setting . . . [because] ‘not a single piece of financial or empirical
scholarship affirms . . . that public company shares systematically trade at a substantial
discount to the net present value of the corporation.’ ” Id. (quoting Hamermesh & Wachter at
5–6). In addition, the Business Court reasoned that the dissenters were not entitled to recoup
a share of the premium which accrued to BAT upon obtaining a sole ownership of RAIfor the
following reasons:
299. The value attributable to a control premium is a
subjective value on behalf of the acquirer; that is, it onlyreflects
the value that the acquirer believes it can add. (Gompers Tr.
912:10–17 (“[S]omebody buys the assets because they believe
that they’re going to be better. They’regoing to be able to, you
know, fire lazy managers and the
A minority discount is, at least conceptually, the converse of a control premium: it is the
valuation of a share held by a minority stakeholder at a lesser value than the stakeholder’s pro rata
share of the value of the total corporation because of the fact that theminority stakeholder cannot
exercise control over the corporation. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control
Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 Bus. Law. 127 (2001); see also Barry M. Wertheimer, The
Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How CourtsDetermine Fair Value, 47 Duke L.J. 613, 641 n.136
(1998) (“The term ‘minority discount’ refers to a valuation of minority shares at less than their
proportionate share of the value ofthe corporation as a whole, reflecting the minority shareholder’s
inability to exercise controlover corporate decisionmaking.”).
6
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like.” (emphasis added)).) Because this value is unique to the
particular acquirer—here, BAT—the “control premium
represents the value only under the control of the [acquirer].”
(Gompers Tr. 912:17–18.)
300. As Yilmaz testified, a company’s value is
determined from the perspective of “an independent firm that is
expected to go on as an independent entity[.]” (Yilmaz Tr.
1866:24–1867:7.) Yilmaz clarified: “Just to be sure we are all on
the same page, this does not have any kind of minority discount
or some kind of acquisition premium or control premium
attached to it.” (Yilmaz Tr. 1867:8–10.) Gompers agreed with
Yilmaz: “So if what you’re trying to value is the firm, the fair
value of the firm,assuming no transaction, you should not gross
it up by some control premium.” (Gompers Tr. 911:7–9.)
301. Thus, evidence relating to whether certain
calculations in the record need to have a control premium added
to them to be reflective of RAI’s fair value is neitherpersuasive
nor relevant in determining RAI’s fair value here. (Wajnert Tr.
165:23–166:4, 167:10–17, 168:4–13; Gilchrist Tr. 551:1–17;
Gompers Tr. 846:16–848:9, 854:24– 855:3, 858:5–22, 901:19–
902:16, 908:10–18; DX0277.0019–
.0020;
PX0115.0397–.0398;
DX0277.0019–0020;
PX0115.0397–0398;
Constantino
Tr.
1829:24–1830:3,
1830:10–24, 1848:16–18.)
Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *54.
¶ 55

The Business Court’s explanation for rejecting the dissenters’ control premium
argument implicates two distinct questions. The first is primarily methodological. When a
court credits a publicly held corporation’s adjusted unaffected share price as an indicator of
the fair value of that corporation in an appraisal proceeding, should the court presume that
the share price reflects an implicit minority discount? The
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second is primarily legal. If a corporation’s adjusted unaffected share price does reflect an
implicit minority discount, must a court account for the discount by allocating some or all
of the control premium which accrues to the controllingstakeholder to the dissenting
shareholders?
¶ 56

The Business Court and the dissenters both answer these questions with a
generalizable rule. The Business Court concluded that the price of publicly traded
corporations categorically does not reflect an implicit minority discount. Reynolds Am. Inc.,
2020 WL 2029621, at *66. Further, the Business Court reasoned that even if publicly traded
corporations do trade at a discount, dissenting shareholders are categorically not entitled to
any share of the control premium accruing to a controllingstakeholder because the premium
is created by the purchaser. Id. at *54. By contrast,the dissenters argue that “market-based
valuation metrics adopted by the Business Court (trading price and adjusted trading price)
reflect a minority discount that . . . must be accounted for” whenever a court appraises the
value of shares held by a minority stakeholder. They argue that a court must award dissenting
shareholders a pro rata share of the control premium because “[c]ontrol is inherent in the
corporationand does not come into existence as a result of the transaction at issue.”

¶ 57

We are not prepared to go so far as to establish a blanket rule on the recordbefore
us in this case. Instead, we hold that a court’s decision to find that a particularmarket-based
method of valuing a corporation does or does not reflect an implicit
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minority discount—and a court’s separate decision to allow or reject a dissenting
shareholder’s claim to their pro rata portion of a control premium—should be based on the
record before the court in each particular case.
¶ 58

Our decision not to impose a universal rule is in part a reflection of theunsettled
nature of the law and scholarship on this issue. While courts have at times described the
implicit minority discount as “inherent” in certain market-based valuation methodologies,
see e.g., Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 12207-NC, 2004 WL 1752847, at *35
(Del. Ch. July 30, 2004) (unpublished) (explaining that comparative company analyses suffer
from an “inherent minority discount”), the more recent cases suggest it is inappropriate to
presume that market- based valuation metrics systematically misvalue corporations that
trade on anefficient market, see, e.g., In re Stillwater Mining Co., No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL
3943851, at *51 (explaining that “[f]or purposes of determining fair value in an appraisal
proceeding . . . the trading price has a lot going for it” and citing to variousarticles critiquing
the presumption that the shares of public corporations trade at an implicit minority
discount). One recent decision acknowledged “a period when [the Delaware] court added a
control premium to an appraisal valuation derived from a comparable company
methodology to correct for the implicit minority discount that was understood to infect that
method,” implying by use of the past tense that the timefor presuming the existence of an
implicit minority discount and automatically
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adding a control premium has passed. In re Appraisal of Regal Ent. Grp., No. 2018- 0266-JTL,
2021 WL 1916364, at *51 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2021) (emphasis added) (unpublished). Read
together, these cases suggest an unresolved tension between thepresumption that efficient
markets reliably reflect fair value and the presumption that even efficient markets inevitably
undervalue the shares of publicly traded corporations. We believe this tension counsels
against adopting a universal legal presumption that any given market-based valuation
methodology does or does not reflect an implicit minority discount.
¶ 59

In addition, corporate law scholars are not uniformly in agreement that it is
appropriate to assume all market-based methodologies necessarily undervalue the shares
held by minority stakeholders. As the Business Court noted, two scholars haveasserted that
“not a single piece of financial or empirical scholarship affirms the corepremise . . . that public
company shares systematically trade at a substantial discountto the net present value of the
corporation.” Id. at 5. The authors of that article are not alone in their skepticism. See also
Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 Bus.
Law. 127, 128 (2001) (“[T]here is no basis for the assumption that market prices routinely
build in a minority discount.”); R. Scott Widen, Delaware Law, Financial Theory and
Investment Banking Valuation Practice, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 579, 602 n.101 (2008) (“[T]he
pricesof publicly traded securities do not include a minority discount.”); William J. Carney
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& Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware Courts’ Struggle with
Control Premiums, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 863 (2003) (criticizing the Delawarecourts’ thenexisting “operative assumption” that “all publicly traded shares reflect an implicit minority
discount”). Although there are certainly countervailing opinions,there does not appear to be
a consensus view.
¶ 60

In this case, we will not presume that the price of RAI’s shares reflected animplicit
minority discount in the absence of any evidence in the record to support thisassertion. As we
have noted, “[i]n a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving
their respective valuation positions.” Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd., 240 A.3d
at 17 (quoting M.G. Bancorp., Inc., 737 A.2d at 520). A dissenting shareholder seeking to
challenge the reliability of a market-based valuation technique must present evidence from
which the trial court could concludethat a particular market-based valuation methodology
undervalues the corporation’sshares. Because the existence and magnitude of any implicit
minority discount—andthe magnitude and availability to the dissenting shareholders of any
control premium—depends on the nature of the transaction, corporation, and market at issue
in any given appraisal proceeding, we reject the notion that a court necessarily commits legal
error by failing to correct a market-based valuation methodology for an implicit minority
discount or by failing to award the dissenting shareholders a controlpremium.

REYNOLDS AM. INC. V. THIRD MOTION EQUITIES MASTER FUND LTD.
2021-NCSC-162
Opinion of the Court

¶ 61

In this case, we disagree with the dissenters that the existence of an implicitminority
discount is so self-evident as to warrant imposing a legal presumption in theabsence of record
evidence. Cf. Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995WL 376911, at *3 (Del. Ch.
June 15, 1995) (“Petitioners cannot add a premium to themarket price unless they prove that
publicly traded shares include a minoritydiscount.”).7 The dissenters have not identified any
testimony or record evidence supporting their assertion that RAI’s share price reflected an
implicit minority discount. They have made no attempt to estimate the size of any such
discount. We will not presume that which the dissenters have made no effort to prove.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Business Court did not err in crediting Professor
Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price analysis without accounting for an implicit
minority discount. Because the dissenters have not shown that any methodology the
BusinessCourt relied upon underestimated the fair value of their shares, we also conclude that
the Business Court could not have erred in refusing to award the dissenters a pro rata share
of any control premium obtained by BAT.

Further, the fact that a corporation’s market share price may reflect an implicit minority
discount does not necessarily mean that a minority stakeholder is entitled to someor all of the control
premium obtained by the purchaser. Accordingly, in a future case wherea dissenting shareholder is
able to prove that a valuation methodology undervalued their shares because the methodology
reflected an implicit minority discount, the dissenting shareholder would also need to present
evidence regarding the size of the discount and the corresponding amount the shareholder is entitled
to under our appraisal statutes. See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 368
n.111 (Del. 2017) (“[I]n orderto value a company as a going concern, synergies must be excluded.”).
7
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E. The Business Court determined the fair value of RAI’s shares on thedate the
merger closed.
¶ 62

The dissenters’ final challenge to the Business Court’s fair value determinationis their
claim that the Business Court “fail[ed] to value RAI as of the Transaction Date,” which the
dissenters contend “is an error of law warranting reversal of the decision below.” The
Business Court determined that “the fair value of RAI at the Merger closing on July 25, 2017
was no more than the deal price of $59.64.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *35
(emphasis added). In the dissenters’ view, notwithstanding the Business Court’s express (and
repeated) attestations that it wasvaluing their shares as of the date the merger closed, the
Business Court actually valued RAI’s shares as of an earlier date.

¶ 63

All parties agree that N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5) required the Business Court tovalue the
dissenters’ shares as of the transaction date. After careful review, we conclude that the
Business Court adhered to this requirement.

¶ 64

The dissenters’ primary argument to the contrary rests on a faulty syllogism.
According to the dissenters, if the Business Court determined that the fair value of RAI’s
shares was no more than the $59.64 per share that RAI paid upon receiving the notice of
appraisal, and if $59.64 per share was the value of the merger considerationon the date BAT
and RAI agreed to merge, then the Business Court necessarily valued the dissenters’ shares
as of the date BAT and RAI agreed to merge. But “fair value” as defined under N.C.G.S. § 5513-01(5) is not the same as the best possible
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value the sellers could have extracted or the value the sellers were ultimately able toextract.
The dissenters chose to avail themselves of the judicial appraisal process. There was no
guarantee that the court would determine fair value to be equal to or greater than the actual
deal price. Indeed, as the Business Court noted, “some analysts perceived BAT to be
overpaying or at least purchasing at a time when RAI was trading at a relatively high multiple
to its earnings.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *20. The fact that the Business Court
determined the fair value of the dissenters’ shares to be less than the deal price does not
prove that the BusinessCourt failed to assess fair value at the proper moment in time.
¶ 65

Additionally, the dissenters argue that the rise in value of the merger
consideration—which was caused by growth in the price of BAT’s shares—necessarily
reflected an increase in “RAI’s standalone value, including the increased likelihood of
corporate tax reform and an accommodative regulatory climate for the US tobacco industry.”
“[I]n an appraisal proceeding, the party seeking an adjustment to the dealprice reflecting a
valuation change between signing and closing bears the burden to identify that change and
prove the amount to be adjusted.” Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd., 240 A.3d at
17. The dissenters bore the burden of proving boththat there was value accretion after the
merger agreement and that the growth in value was attributable to RAI, excluding value
accretion in anticipation of the merger. After meeting that burden, the dissenters further
needed to prove that the
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value accretion rendered the Business Court’s determination of fair value too low.
¶ 66

Here, the Business Court relied upon Professor Gompers’s adjusted unaffectedstock
price analysis, which specifically accounted for the possibility that “in the timebetween the
October 20 Offer and the Transaction Date, events took place that may have affected RAI’s
standalone value and been reflected in RAI’s stock price had BATnot made its October 20
Offer.” Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *38. Based on the results of that analysis, the
Business Court determined that “while RAI’s stockprice may have appreciated to some degree
in the time between the October 20 Offerand the Transaction Date, RAI’s stock would still
have traded 7% to 10% below the deal price as of July 24, 2017.” Id. Thus, even after
accounting for the likelihood thatRAI’s shares would have appreciated in the absence of the
merger announcement, the Business Court—cross-checking the results of Professor
Gompers’s analysis with the results of numerous other analyses presented at trial—
determined that the fair valueof RAI’s shares on the date of closing did not exceed the
value of the mergerconsideration on the date of the merger agreement. Rather than commit
legal error, the Business Court was appropriately “unconvinced by [the dissenters’]
conclusory arguments for an adjustment to the deal price and declined to grant the
adjustment because [they] failed to meet their burden of proof.” Brigade Leveraged Cap.
Structures Fund Ltd., 240 A.3d at 17.
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IV.
¶ 67

The dissenters’ claim that they are entitled to additional interest
payments
Finally, the dissenters contend that they are entitled to “interest . . . calculatedon the

total fair value amount, not any difference between that amount and the amount already
paid.” Put another way, the dissenters argue that North Carolina law “requires judgment to
be calculated by starting with the adjudged fair value of RAI’s shares, add[ing] interest at the
legal rate through the date of judgment, and then subtract[ing] the amounts already paid.”
Reynolds Am. Inc., 2020 WL 2029621,at *71. They argue they are entitled to interest payments
on the amount the BusinessCourt assessed to be fair value accruing until the Business Court
entered its final judgment, even if this Court affirms the Business Court’s judgment that RAI
initiallypaid fair value for the dissenters’ shares.
¶ 68

In support of their argument, the dissenters point to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e)(2019),
which provides in relevant part that “[e]ach shareholder made a party to theproceeding is
entitled to judgment . . . for the amount, if any, by which the court findsthe fair value of the
shareholder’s shares, plus interest, exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to the
shareholder for the shareholder’s shares.” Although this text could be read to support the
dissenters’ position, this language is not “clear and without ambiguity.” Diaz v. Div. of Soc.
Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387 (2006). What is clear from the text of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e) is that
a corporation must pay interest to shareholders who seek judicial appraisal. But the text does
not definitely establish
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how interest should be calculated. Because the language is “ambiguous or susceptible to
multiple meanings, we turn to the other sources to identify the General Assembly’sintent.” N.C.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Lunsford, 378 N.C. 181, 2021-NCSC-83, ¶ 20.
¶ 69

Reading this statutory language in context, we agree with the Business Courtthat the
dissenters’ proposed interpretation of the statute would produce “a nonsensical result, one
supported neither by the text of the statute nor the intent of the legislature.” Reynolds Am.
Inc., 2020 WL 2029621, at *71. Another provision of the appraisal statutes defines interest
as accruing “from the effective date of the corporate action until the date of payment, at the
rate of interest on judgments in this State on the effective date of the corporate action.”
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(6). It is reasonable to presume that the legislature intended its
definition of “interest” in
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(6) to be incorporated into another provision of the appraisal statutes
where the term is otherwise undefined. See Pelham Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Transp., 303 N.C.
424, 434 (1981) (“It is within the power of the legislature to definea word used in a statute,
and that statutory definition controls the interpretation of that statute.” (citation omitted)).

¶ 70

Additionally, the obvious intent of the appraisal statutes is to ensure that every
shareholder has an opportunity “to obtain payment of the fair value of that shareholder’s
shares” in circumstances where the General Assembly believes the
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nature of and circumstances attendant to a transaction risks depriving certain shareholders
of fair value. N.C.G.S. § 55-13-02(a). The intent is to ensure thatshareholders are made whole,
not to give sophisticated entities another incentive to pursue “appraisal arbitrage.” In re
Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015); see
also Booth at 156 (“[I]t is important that appraisal not be used as a way for holdout
stockholders to second-guess the will of the rest of the minority stockholders.”). Given this
clear intent, the result of the dissenters’ interpretation—which would require RAI to pay the
dissenters more than
$100 million in interest payments, even though it has been established that RAI initially paid
the dissenters fair value—is absurd. See Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163,
166 (1971) (“The language of the statute will be interpreted to avoid absurd
consequences.”). Accordingly, we reject the dissenters’ proposed construction of these
provisions.
V.
¶ 71

Conclusion

“The task of placing a value after the fact on shares of stock previously
exchanged involves inexact approximations and a great deal of imprecision.” Cont’l Water Co.
v. United States, No. 125-78, 1982 WL 11255, at *6 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (per curiam). The fair value
of a corporation cannot be determined by mathematical proof. Instead, “[e]stimations,
predictions, and inferences based on professional judgment and experience are key
ingredients in any valuation.” Brown v. Brewer, No. CV06-
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3731-GHK SHX, 2010 WL 2472182, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) (unpublished).
¶ 72

In this case, the Business Court was presented with two radically different
estimations of the fair value of shares of RAI held by a group of dissenting shareholders. To
resolve this dispute, the Business Court utilized various “customary and current valuation
concepts and techniques” to determine the fair value of the dissenters’ shares, as was
required under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). That there may exist some evidence in the record
which detracts from the Business Court’s ultimate determination of the fair value of the
dissenters’ shares is no cause to disturb its judgment. Instead, we agree with RAI that the
Business Court determined the fair value of RAI shares in a manner which comported with
the guidelines set forth in North Carolina’s appraisal statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the
Business Court’s judgment in which it concluded that the dissenters were paid fair value for
their shares.
AFFIRMED.

